states are significantly more likely to engage in partisan acts than are residents of other states, even after controlling for the characteristics of state populations. Similarly, residents of some states are significantly more likely to engage in acts supporting a given party than are residents of other states, again even after controlling for the composition of state populations.
Political scientists and historians have recognized that there exists variation in the strength (i.e., level) of partisanship in the United States (Campbell et al., 1960; Formisano, 1999; Norrander, 1989; Silbey, 1991) . For instance, in her study of partisanship levels between 1976 and 1982 , Norrander (1989 suggests that "the proportion of a state's residents who consider themselves to be independent varies vastly across the states" (p. 516). Geographic variation in the strength of partisanship is not merely restricted to the contemporary era, however. In his work on political parties, the historian Silbey (1991) claimed that intense "two-party competition existed throughout the nation in the late nineteenth century . . . yet, antipartyism still lived in several nooks and corners of the nation" (p. 326). Similarly, historians Altschuler and Blumin (1997) suggest that although election totals in the late nineteenth century reflect deep political engagement in some places, there were other areas in the post-civil war America where large numbers of voters were "uninterested in, skeptical about, or even averse to political affairs" (pp. 884-885) .
A cursory examination of the strength of partisanship -which, following standard practice (see, e.g., Burnham, 1965; Rusk, 1970) , is operationalized by our measure of split-ticket voting 2 -between 1880 and 1940 across 45 states reported in Table 1 confirms the idea that the strength of partisanship did possess a distinct geographic component during this time period. For instance, in Table 1 , we find that the mean level of split-ticket voting between 1880 and 1940 in Illinois, North Carolina, Indiana, West Virginia, and New Jersey is as low as 2.191, 2.986, 1.158, 1.925, and 2.631, respectively. This indicates that the level of partisanship was quite high in these five states during this era. The mean level of split-ticket voting between 1880 and 1940 in Minnesota, Tennessee, Oregon, and Texas was as high as 9. 124, 10.447, 12.113, and 9.673, respectively. This suggests that the level of partisanship was substantially lower in these four states. Difference of means tests confirm that the difference in the mean level of split-ticket voting between each of the states mentioned above in this time period is statistically significant (p = .000). The statistically significant difference in the mean level of splitticket voting across these states from widely different regional locations indicates that there is substantial variation in the strength of partisanship during the 1880 to 1940 time period.
Although there is little doubt that geographic variation in the level of partisanship is distinct across states during the 1880-1940 era, there is remark- ably little consensus on the sources of this geographical variation, which is often referred to under the category of "political culture." While early work alluded to the migration and geographic concentration of ethnic and religious groups as ultimately causal of state political cultures (Elazar, 1966, p. 94) , later work has discounted this as a possible explanation (Erikson et al., 1987 (Erikson et al., , 1993 . Existing theories of partisanship, whether affective or instrumental, also offer little help in explaining this geographic variation. Indeed, in 1987 Erikson et al. noted "the importance and the mystery of state political cultures," whereas in 1993 the same authors concluded that the development of state and regional patterns of partisanship remained fundamentally unexplained (Erikson et al., 1993, p. 71) .
In this article, we address the issue of variation in the strength of partisanship across states in the 1880-1940 period, leaving geographic patterns in the direction of partisanship to later work. Unlike existing theories that focus on either affective or instrumental approaches to partisanship, we suggest here that the introduction of three main electoral laws during the 1880-1940 time period-party registration, primaries, and secret ballots-can help account for geographic variation in the level of partisanship across states between 1880 and 1940, as captured in Table 1 . Specifically, we argue that the introduction of party registration in certain states had the intended (or perhaps unintended) effect of increasing the frequency and observability of overt partisan actions such as public declaration of support for a party's candidate and voter participation in party-nominating processes in these states. We suggest that the increasing frequency and observability of partisan actions generated social pressures to conform to overt acts of partisanship. This, in turn, led to norms of partisan behavior that translated to higher levels of partisanship and lower levels of split-ticket voting in these states. Conversely, we claim that the introduction of primaries and secret ballots in other states reduced the frequency and observability of partisan actions in these states. A decline in the frequency and observability of partisan behavior reduced the incentives for citizens in states with primaries and secret ballots to engage in overt partisan acts and, therefore, to an increase in split-ticket voting. This consequently led to a decline in partisanship levels in such states.
We test our claims with aggregate data on split-ticket voting between 1880 and 1940, a period during which many states changed their electoral laws in ways that had direct consequences for the strength of partisanship. Estimates from several time-series cross-section (TSCS) regression models and error correction (EC) models suggest that party registration substantially and significantly, in the statistical sense, reduced split-ticket voting (i.e., increased levels of partisanship) during the 1880-1940 period, even after controlling for the strength of state party organization, demographic attrib-utes, and other variables. The estimates also show that statewide direct primaries and secret ballots substantially and significantly increased split-ticket voting (i.e., decreased levels of partisanship) between 1880 and 1940. Our statistical results remain robust after correcting for endogeneity and selection bias.
The article is organized as follows. We present a brief literature review. Then we discuss our main theoretical claims and hypotheses. This is followed by our presentation of the statistical results that emerge from testing our hypotheses. We end with a brief conclusion.
Literature Review
Recent scholarship on the phenomenon of partisanship offers two alternative theories to account for individual variation in the strength of partisanship, or the propensity to take actions in support of a party.
2 One school of thought models the propensity to engage in partisan acts as a function of affective or emotional identifications with parties (Abramson & Ostrom, 1991; Campbell et al., 1960; Green & Palmquist, 1994; Green, Palmquist, & Shickler, 1998) . These affective benefits may themselves vary in strength across individuals, leading to cross-individual variation in the propensity to take action in support of parties. Another tradition models the propensity to act in support of a party as a function of cumulating party performance evaluations (Brody & Rothenberg, 1988; MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1989 , 1992 . Those individuals who have encountered more periods of favorable experiences with a particular party's incumbents have greater incentives to take actions in support of that party.
Even though these theoretical approaches offer insights into the phenomenon at issue, both share three flaws. First, neither of these models can account for the geographic variation in the propensity to engage in partisan acts. We have no reason to expect that the distribution of affective partisan attachments would possess such a clear geographic component. Similarly, we have no reason to expect that incumbent performance would vary systematically by state or region, leading to systematic statewide and regional variation in the willingness to take partisan actions. Second, neither of these theoretical approaches makes an unambiguous prediction about the propensity to act in support of a party. It is not clear that either strong affective attachments toward a particular party, or an accumulation of positive experiences with a party's incumbents, will translate into a higher propensity to act in support of that party. After all, in both of these cases individuals will still face strong incentives to free ride on the support of others.
Finally, both existing theoretical models ignore how electoral laws may engender variation in the strength of partisanship. This is problematic given that Rusk (1970) found that changes in state-level ballot laws around the turn of the century led to changes in levels of split-ticket voting, a common aggregate measure of the strength of partisanship. Specifically, Rusk argued that prior to the passage of Australian (secret) ballot laws by most state legislatures in the 1890s, voters had little choice but to vote the straight-party tickets produced by the parties themselves. After the passage of secret ballot laws, however, voters were able to choose between multiple parties' candidates listed on the same ballot. Rusk, in fact, found that the introduction of secret ballots appeared to increase split-ticket voting between 1876 and 1908. Although Rusk's causal story has been challenged by electoral historians (see Prince, 1964, p. 188) , his empirical findings suggest that theoretical accounts of variation in partisanship levels should take into account the possibility that the propensity of partisan actions may be substantially influenced by electoral laws.
Theoretical Argument and Propositions
Unlike affective or instrumental approaches to partisanship, we suggest here that certain electoral laws influence the strength and/or level of partisanship by increasing or decreasing the observability of partisan behavior in the areas (i.e., states) in which these laws were introduced. In particular, we suggest that a certain electoral law, that increased the observability of partisan behavior within the population in the areas in which the law was introduced, generated beliefs among individuals in those areas that public acts of partisan behavior are socially "proper" and are common behavioral norms. Such beliefs, in turn, created rational incentives and social pressures for individuals to conform to norms of partisanship, which helped to strengthen partisanship in these areas. Conversely, other electoral laws that decreased the observability of partisan behavior in the areas in which the laws were introduced arguably generated a perception among individuals in these areas that public acts of partisan behavior are socially "improper" and unacceptable. This consequently dampened their incentives to overtly engage in partisan behavior, which served to weaken the level of partisanship in these areas.
The discussion in the preceding paragraph gives rise to two questions. First, which electoral law increased the observability of partisan behavior, and contrarily which electoral law decreased the observability of partisan behavior? Second, how do electoral laws influence the strength of partisanship by affecting the observability of partisan action in the areas in which Harvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 373 these laws were introduced? Although to our knowledge it has not been remarked on in the scholarly literature, electoral laws can affect the observability of partisan actions. For example, states can vary the observability of self-declared voter partisanship and voter participation in party nomination processes by introducing electoral laws, which may consequently affect the level of partisanship. Between 1880 and 1940, many states changed their electoral laws in these ways, which had clear implications for the osbervability of partisan behavior and, thus, for the strength of partisanship in areas where existing electoral laws were reformed or where new electoral laws were introduced.
An electoral law that increased the observability of partisan actions was the system of party registration. Most state party organizations in the late 19th century required that an individual declare an affiliation with a party prior to participating in that party's nomination process; these requirements were often later codified in state legislation regulating party caucuses and primaries (Dallinger, 1897; Merriam, 1908; Merriam & Overacker, 1928) . Prior to the introduction of party registration, however, these individual declarations of party affiliation were not a matter of public record. Under party registration, first introduced in Kentucky in 1892, voters wishing to participate in party caucuses or primaries were required to allow their partisanship to be recorded in the registration files kept by local election officials. These records of partisanship were then available for public consumption during the intervals between caucuses and primaries and would have permitted observation of the choice of any given individual to declare herself or himself a partisan. By making voters' partisan self-declarations a matter of public record, party registration increased the observability of those declarations (Keyssar, 2000; Schudson, 1998) .
Increasing the observability of declarations of partisanship had, in our view, two important effects. First, it had an informational effect in that it helped individuals to observe and learn that the prevailing degree of partisanship, for example, the practice of public acts of self-declaration of partisanship was common in areas where party registration was introduced. To understand why this is the case, imagine that citizens in some area are in a state of the world in which partisan actions are observed with a low probability. In particular, suppose that individuals have no way of knowing whether others have formally declared themselves to be partisans, other than by attending the party meetings at which these declarations are made. Many who have made these formal but unobserved declarations will, thus, appear to others as nonpartisans. Now suppose that a state introduces an electoral law such as party registration that requires officials to record these formal declarations and to make them available for public consumption in the inter-vals between elections. Because these partisan declarations can now be observed with a higher probability, some who were previously thought to be nonpartisans will now, in fact, be observed as partisans. The probability of observing nonpartisan inactions will, thus, diminish; and conversely, the likelihood and frequency of partisan actions will increase exponentially.
Second, when partisan actions are observed with a higher frequency and likelihood, individuals start believing that partisanship is a common and acceptable behavioral norm, which, in turn, gives them incentives to engage in acts of partisanship. This is because of two reasons. First, participating in partisan actions along with others in areas where public acts of partisanship are common can be valuable to individuals engaged in partisanship. Indeed, participation in partisan actions in such situations can increase the likelihood of social acceptance by other group members, which, in turn, can increase individuals' social and economic opportunities. Second, if acts of partisanship do exist as a behavioral norm in a certain area-which is common knowledge to individuals in that area-then each individual may fear social exclusion (and perhaps social ostracism) if he or she does not overtly participate in partisan behavior. Hence, individuals are more likely to adopt partisanship and participate in overt acts of partisanship when public acts of partisan behavior become more common and observable. Note that when more individuals start adopting partisanship because of the reasons discussed above, it has a positive feedback effect in that it further promotes the visibility of partisan actions. Greater visibility and frequency of partisan actions create social pressures to conform to norms of partisan behavior and induce additional individuals to engage in acts of partisanship. This process continues till partisanship emerges as a population equilibrium, where individuals have no incentives to deviate from overt acts of partisanship. Rather, they prefer to conform to the norm of partisanship in the population in this case. The preceding discussion leads to the following: In sharp contrast to party registration, an electoral law that reduced the visibility of partisan actions was that requiring mandatory statewide direct primaries. Prior to the introduction of such legislation, voter participation in party nomination processes was a public and collective affair. Parties governed their own nomination processes, including arranging nomination meetings or caucuses that could be attended by party voters. These party nomination meetings allowed those in attendance to observe each other's participation in what was a clear act of partisanship (Berdahl, 1942; Dallinger, 1897; Fischer, 1965; Merriam, 1908) . Mandatory statewide direct primary legislation dramatically altered this state of affairs. Such laws typically included provisions that required primary elections to be held by all parties on a particular day over some span of hours (Merriam,1908; Merriam & Overacker, 1928) . Those who chose to engage in the partisan act of primary participation would, therefore, no longer all be in the same room at the same time. Participation in a party's nomination process could now be observed only by the election officials staffing the polling place, as well as by the few other individuals whom one might see participating as well. Thus, direct primaries had the effect of reducing the observability of partisan behavior. Moreover, Galderisi and Ginsberg (1986) suggest that primaries even had the direct effect of reducing partisanship because "primaries tend to direct the attention of voters and political activists toward the nominating contests of the party most likely to win the general election and away from the interparty race" (p. 116).
Another electoral law that reduced the observability of partisan actions was that requiring secret ballots. Prior to the introduction of secret ballots, the observability of individuals' choices to vote an apparent straight-party ticket was quite high. Voters would obtain straight-ticket ballots from party poll workers on election day and deposit the brightly and distinctively colored ballots into ballot boxes in full view of the sizable crowds that would gather around polling places (Baker, 1983; Fischer, 1965; Formisano, 1983; McCormick, 1953; Prince, 1964; Reynolds, 1988; Young, 1967) . Although these ballots could be altered to indicate the choice of another party's candidates, an altered ballot would still be observed to be a straight-ticket ballot by onlookers. After the introduction of secret ballots, however, the observability of individuals' straight-ticket voting would have decreased significantly.
A decrease in the observability of partisan behavior will lead to a decline in the aggregate level of partisanship in states where primaries and secret ballots are introduced. To see why, first imagine that our players are in a state of the world in which partisan actions are observed with a high probability. Nonpartisan inactions are, therefore, observed with a correspondingly low probability. For example, suppose that parties convene their own local nomination meetings. Those who attend these nomination meetings can, thus, be observed by all other participants in the nomination process. Suppose also that a state begins to regulate the nomination process by introducing statewide direct primaries. These primaries will be held over the course of an entire day. Now, an individual who chooses to participate in a party's nomination process can be observed only by those few who happen to visit the polls at the same time as this voter. As a result, some partisan actions, which were previously observed, now will be unobserved. These unobserved partisan actions will be observationally indistinguishable from the nonpartisan inactions of those who choose to abstain from primary participation altogether. The frequency and likelihood of observing partisan behavior in the population will, therefore, decrease dramatically. As noted earlier, when individuals do not observe partisan behavior in the population, they will, in all likelihood, learn that public acts of partisanship are unacceptable. In fact, they might come to believe that nonpartisanship is the more common norm in such situations. When individuals believe that nonpartisanship is the prevailing norm, they clearly have low incentives to adopt partisanship because engaging in partisan behavior in such situations will not result in tangible benefits and may even be costly. Consequently, nonpartisanship becomes more prevalent in states where primaries and secret ballots were introduced. Hence, Proposition 2: Primaries and secret ballots decreased the level and/or strength of partisanship in states in which these electoral laws were introduced during the 1880 to 1940 time period.
Empirical Tests Dependent Variable
Proposition 1 suggests that party registration generated a norm of partisan behavior in the states in which it was introduced and, thus, had the effect of increasing the level (i.e., strength) of partisanship. Proposition 2 suggests that primaries and secret ballots had the effect of decreasing the level of partisanship because these electoral laws discouraged acts of partisanship (or, in other words, encouraged nonpartisan behavior) in the states in which they were introduced. Note that norms of partisanship and nonpartisanship govern a range of behaviors or actions. One action governed by these norms is vote choice, specifically whether to vote for a single party's candidates (as is presumably dictated by a norm of partisanship) or to vote for multiple parties' candidates (as presumably implied by a norm of nonpartisanship). We can, therefore, use data on split-ticket voting to operationalize our dependent variable, the existence and prevalence of norms of partisanship.
As noted earlier, the period between 1880 and 1940 in the United States provides considerable state-level variation in the observability of partisan actions. Although we lack individual-level data on split-ticket voting for this period, we can more crudely measure adherence to a norm of partisanship or nonpartisanship with aggregate data on split-ticket voting. One problem with Harvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 377 aggregate measures of ticket splitting is that it understates actual ticket splitting as a result of the ecological inference (EI) problem. In the modern context, researchers can use EI techniques (e.g., King, 1997) , along with votes recorded at the precinct or congressional district level, to generate better estimates of split tickets (cf. Burden & Kimball, 1998) . However, votes for statewide offices were not recorded at the precinct or even congressional district level for the 1880-1940 period, precluding us from using precinct or congressional level district data. Hence, given severe data constraints for the time period examined here, we use aggregate data on split-ticket voting. Although aggregate data may underestimate actual split tickets, we do not expect there to be any correlation between this measurement error and our independent variables.
We operationalize split tickets in the following way: Split-ticket voting is defined as |g it -c it |, where g it is the Democratic vote share for governor in state i in year t and is the statewide average Democratic vote share for Congress in state i in year t. where d it is the number of votes cast for the Democratic congressional candidate in district i in year t, is the total number of votes cast in congressional district i in year t, and n is equal to the number of congressional districts in the state. Races were eliminated if they did not contain a Democratic candidate, if the Democratic candidate ran unopposed, or if the reported results from the contest listed more than one candidate per party. Contests were not eliminated based on the presence or magnitude of vote shares for other parties' candidates.
Our measure of split-ticket voting is different from that of Burnham (1965) and Rusk (1970) , who define split-ticket voting in state i and year t as | max ( , , ) 
where p it = the Democratic presidential vote share in state i and year t. Unlike the Burnhamesque measure, which implies that different "race sets" would be used across states and over time, the gubernatorial and/or congressional measure that we construct is preferable because it measures split tickets in comparable races across states. Note that higher levels of split-ticket voting imply weaker partisanship, whereas lower levels of split-ticket voting, that corresponds to straight-ticket voting, indicates strong partisanship. Given the prediction in Proposition 1 that party registration strengthens partisanship and the prediction in Proposition 2 that party registration and secret ballots decrease partisanship, we test the following hypotheses stated with respect to split-ticket voting as the dependent variable: We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on aggregate data of split-ticket voting for 45 states between 1880 and 1940. Pooling states and years between 1880 and 1940 yields an (unbalanced) TSCS of 45 states and 31 election periods. Given the idiosyncrasies of the timing of gubernatorial elections, the elimination of the races noted above, as well as missing data, most states' time series are incomplete over this period of time. Earlier, we briefly pointed out that there is, indeed, a strong geographical component associated with the strength of partisanship-as captured by split-ticket voting-in the United States from 1880 to 1940. This is also true of our data, as can be seen in the means of Democratic congressional and/or gubernatorial split-ticket voting across 20-year periods and even the entire 1880-1940 period, reported by state in Table 1 .
Independent and Control Variables
The key independent variables of interest in Hypotheses 1 and 2 are party registration, primaries, and secret ballots. Party registration is operationalized as a dummy variable that is coded as 1 for states with mandatory statewide primaries party registration laws in the 1880-1940 period. In Table 2 , we list the year of enactment of various electoral laws-including party registration, primaries, and secret ballots-by each state in the 1880-1940 period. The information in Table 2 is drawn from Katz and Sala (1996) , Merriam (1908) , and Merriam and Overacker (1928) . Because Hypothesis 1 predicts that party registration increases the level of partisanship and because an increase (decrease) in the degree of split-ticket voting implies lower (higher) levels of partisanship, we expect that the estimate of party registration in the TSCS regression models will be negative. 4 To test the prediction in Hypothesis 2, we created the dichotomous variable primaries, which is equal to 1 for states that possessed mandatory statewide direct primaries. From Hypothesis 2, we expect that the predicted relationship between primaries and split-ticket voting will be positive.
5 To complete our test of Hypothesis 2, we also generated the dichotomous variHarvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 379 1904-1915 (continued) able secret ballots that are coded as 1 for states that introduced secret ballots and is zero otherwise. As noted earlier, the observability of individuals' straight-ticket voting would have decreased considerably after the introduction of secret ballots. We should, therefore, expect to see more split-ticket voting in states enacting secret ballots.
6
We include the following control variables in our TSCS regression models. First, note that some states during this period allowed "fusion" candidacies, or the nomination of individual candidates by multiple parties; typically this practice was accompanied by separately tallying each party's contribution to the candidate's vote total. Fusion candidacies allowed voters to support candidates who were publicly supported by most other members of their social circle, but to proffer their support through another party. This practice may have allowed individuals to support alternative parties. We thus control for the presence of fusion candidacies in our empirical model. Specifically, fusion it is coded as a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 for states with fusion candidacies during the period. 7 The predicted relationship between fusion it and the dependent variable is positive: We expect to see more splitticket voting in states where fusion candidacies are allowed. We also include the variable presidential election year t as an indicator for presidential election years, which might independently affect the level of split-ticket voting. We also control for the dummy variable party column ballot that is coded as 1 for states that introduced party column ballots during the 1880-1940 time period. Additional state-level demographic and socioeconomic variables are included in the regression models as well. These include the percentage of population having completed high school (% high school education), percentage of population that is African American (% African American), and percentage of the state's acreage under active cultivation (% farmed land). Data for the demographic and socioeconomic variables listed above are compiled from statistical abstract, Bicentennial Edition: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Carter, 1975 ; specifically from data covering the years 1878-1900 and 1901-1950 are also drawn from Magnuson (1995) and Integrated Public Use Microdata series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al., 2004) . The aforementioned data is primarily a series of high-precision samples of the American population drawn from federal censuses between 1850 and 1990. Finally, we include the variable state party organization strength in the TSCS models. Following Mayhew (1986), we code state party organization strength as a composite variable that ranges from 1 (minimal organization) to 4 (very strong organization). We used the following four criteria-taken from Mayhew's (1986, p. 19 ) criteria for coding the strength of traditional party organization at the state level 8 -to code state party organization strength for the 1880 to 1940 time period:
1. The party at the state level has substantial autonomy in that "it is not the creation of, nor does its maintenance depend on the internal incentive structure of, a separate organization that operates mostly outside electoral politics" (Mayhew, 1986, p. 19 ). 2. The life span of the party is "measurable in decades or generations or rather in months or years" (Mayhew, 1986, p. 19 ). 3. The party's internal structure is hierarchical in that party leaders at the state (and not at the county, district, or ward) level exercise a lot of influence in organizing activities. 4. The party regularly tries to bring about the nomination of candidates for public offices including county, state assembly, state senate, municipal, congressional and statewide offices (Mayhew, 1986, p. 19) Note that if organization of parties in a particular state satisfied all the four criteria mentioned above, then state party organization strength for that state is coded as 4, implying very strong party organization. Conversely, if, for example, parties in a state satisfy only Criteria 1 mentioned above, then state party organization strength for that state is coded as 4, implying weak and/or minimal party organization. The primary and secondary sources used to code state party organization strength are The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States, 1789 (Martis, 1989 , Formisano (1999) , Bensel (2004) , United States Congressional Districts and Data, 1883 -1913 (Parsons, Dubin, & Parsons, 1990 , and Sundquist (1983) .
Our original data for state party organization strength reveals remarkable cross-sectional variation in this variable. In particular, we found that state party organization strength is extremely strong (i.e., on average equal to 3.6) in Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, and West Virginia during the 1880-1940 period. In contrast, state party organization strength is weak (i.e., on average equal to 1.5) for Arkansas, Iowa, and California in the 1880-1940 period. Because stronger state party organization will be better equipped to organize partisan activity and will, thus, generate higher levels of partisanship, we expect that state party organization strength will have a negative effect on split-ticket voting.
Because our sample is TSCS, we estimate our model using panelcorrected standard errors (PCSEs) that are adjusted to account for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (Beck & Katz, 1995 ). We include state-level fixed effects in each model and a time variable to control for any trend effects (coded 1 for year 1 in the series, 2 for year 1 in the series, etc.). Finally, we include the lag of the dependent variable in most models to account for temporal dependence in the data. Estimates from the TSCS regression models are reported in Table 3 .
In Model 1, Table 3 , we report the estimates from our entire sample with state fixed effects, while in Model 2 we report the estimates from our entire sample with state and fixed effects. The estimates of the three electoral law variables are in the predicted direction and are statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficient of party registration is negative and significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 2. In Model 1, a one standard deviation increase in party registration (i.e., from 0 to 1 because it is a dummy variable) in this model decreases split-ticket voting by 16%, when other variables are held at their mean in the sample. This result provides strong support for the prediction in Hypothesis 1.
The coefficient of primaries is positive and highly significant in Model 1. A one-standard-deviation increase in primaries in this empirical model increases split-ticket voting by 23%, when other variables are held at their respective means in the sample. Likewise, the coefficient of secret ballots is positive and significant in this model. A one-standard-deviation increase in secret ballots increases split-ticket voting by 19% when the remaining variables are held at their mean. These results corroborate the prediction in Hypothesis 2 that primaries and secret ballots led to a decrease in the level of partisanship since these laws decreased the observability of partisan actions.
The remaining control variables in Table 3 are, for the most part, statistically insignificant. For example, the indicator for presidential election years is negative but insignificant in all the models in Table 3 . The coefficient of fusion in all the empirical models is surprisingly negative but statistically insignificant. The estimates of the variables that capture demographic attributes (% high school education, % African American) are each statistically insignificant in the TSCS regression models. The estimate of state party organization strength is in the predicted negative direction but is statistically insignificant in Model 1. This suggests that not only state party organization strength did not significantly affect split-ticket voting but also that party registration, primaries, and secret ballots significantly affected split-ticket voting in the predicted direction after controlling for the strength of state party organization. The strong results for the electoral law variables may be driven by their individual correlation with state party organization strength. Fortunately, diagnostic tests reveal that the correlation between state party organization strength and each of the electoral law variables is weak and statistically insignificant. Specifically, the correlation between state party organization strength and (a) party registration is .098, (b) primaries is .127, and (c) secret ballots is .063. Bivariate correlations between party registration and each of the other two electoral law variables is unsurprisingly weak and insignificant, thus mitigating concerns of collinearity. Finally, variance inflation tests show that none of the TSCS empirical models in Table 3 suffer from multicollinearity. 10 We estimated the specification in Models 1 and 2 on a smaller sample that included only nonsouthern states in the 1880-1940 period. Estimates from this test with fixed effects for each nonsouthern state are reported in Model 3. The coefficient of primaries and secret ballots are in the predicted positive direction and are each highly significant in Model 3. The estimate of party registration is also negative and highly significant in Model 3. We repeated the above exercise by estimating another model on a sample of only southern states during the 1880-1940 period.
11 The estimates from the aforementioned specification with fixed effects for only southern states are reported in Model 4, Table 3 . The coefficient of primaries and secret ballots remains positive and significant in Model 4. Party registration is negative and significant, whereas state party organization strength is negative but insignificant in Model 3.
We also restricted the temporal range of our sample from 1880 to 2 years before the New Deal realignment, 1928.
12 The estimates from our empirical model on this restricted temporal sample is reported in Model 5. We find that the institutional variables have a greater substantive impact on split-ticket voting in Model 5. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the negative and highly significant estimate of party registration in Model 5 decreases split-ticket voting by almost 34%. The estimate of primaries and secret ballots remain positive and highly significant in this model. This suggests that the electoral law variables remain robust when the temporal range of the sample is restricted from 1880 to 1928. Diagnostic tests on Models 1 to 5 show that the residuals from these models are not serially correlated, 13 and we did not find any evidence of multicollinearity in these models. 14 Although the results from the TSCS models are useful, they do not provide sufficient information about the instantaneous (i.e., short-term) effect that electoral institutions had on split-ticket voting in the 1880-1940 time period. To get a deeper understanding of the instantaneous effects mentioned above, we estimated some EC models where the dependent variable is the change in split-ticket voting (Dsplit). We include the lag and change (i.e., first difference) of each electoral law variable in the EC model. Note that the change of party registration (i.e., Dparty registration) captures the instantaneous effect of party registration on split-ticket voting, while the lag of party registration captures the long-term effect of this electoral institution on the change in split-ticket voting in the EC model. Similarly, the change in primaries (Dprimaries) and the change in secret ballots (Dsecret ballots) capture the instantaneous effect of each of these two institutional variables on the change in split-ticket voting in the EC model. We include the first difference of all the control variables from the TSCS regression model in each of the EC models. Table 4 presents the results from the EC models that were estimated with individual state dummies in each model. Model 6 provides the results for the full sample, Models 7 and 8 the estimates for the sample of southern and nonsouthern states, respectively, and Model 9 the estimates from the EC model when the sample is restricted from 1880 to 1928.
Observe that the estimate of Dparty registration and the lag of this electoral law variable are negative and highly significant in all the EC models. This suggests quite strongly that the introduction of party registration had a substantive and statistically significant immediate as well as long-term effect on split-ticket voting during the 1880 to 1940 time period. The estimate of Dprimaries and Dsecret ballots is positive and highly significant in all the EC models in Table 4 . This implies that the introduction of these two electoral institutions increased levels of split-ticket and, hence, decreased the strength of partisanship not only in the long run but also in the short run.
Although the results from the TSCS regression and EC models are encouraging, they may suffer from endogeneity and/or selection bias. There may be a potential endogeneity problem in our data because it is possible that in states where partisanship levels were already high, strong party organizations might have been better able to secure the passage of laws, which further strengthened partisanship (and parties). Conversely, in states with historically low levels of partisanship, weak party organizations may have been less able to resist the passage of laws, which further weakened partisanship. 15 We use the two-stage probit least squares (hereafter 2SPLS) method, which is typically applied to correct for endogeneity between a continuous dependent variable and binary endogenous regressors on the right-hand side (Achen, 1986; Alvarez & Glasgow, 2000) . The 2SPLS approach is done in two steps. First, we separately estimate a first-stage equation for each of the endogenous explanatory variables via probit. For the first-stage probit equation, we require variables that predict the conditions under which states were more likely to introduce the electoral institutions being discussed here. Fortunately, we know from the secondary literature on electoral institutions between 1880 and 1940 that the introduction of especially party registration was more likely to occur in urban areas, in areas with higher population density, in states where reformers were most unhappy with existing electoral practices, and in states where party organizations were strong (Epstein, 1986, pp. 127, 135; Merriam & Overacker, 1928, pp. 6-7) . However, other scholars such as Gimpel (1993, p. 375) suggest that areas with higher popuHarvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 387 lation densities and lower literacy rates were more likely to resist progressive reform. We, thus, introduced the following variables in the first-stage probit equation: % farmed land, population density, % rural, % high school education, and state party organization strength. We also introduced two lags of the relevant dependent variable in each first-stage Probit model to correct for serial correlation. The probit estimates in Table 5 show that all three electoral institutions were significantly more likely to occur in more urban areas. We also found that the estimate of state party organization strength in the Probit model where party registration is the dependent variable is positive and significant, which is along expected lines. It is surprising to note, however, the coefficient of state party organization strength in the probit models for primaries and secret ballots is positive even though it is statistically insignificant. We mention "surprising" because we anticipated that states with strong party organizations were more likely to resist electoral reform such as direct primaries. We believe that two reasons can explain this puzzling result.
First, as Buenker (1973, pp. 122, 135) argues, states with strong party organizations embarked on electoral reforms such as primaries superficially even though in reality such reforms did little to weaken the party's organization strength. Second, Buenker (1973) and Gimpel (1993, p. 379) argue that strongly organized parties manipulated "institutional reforms to serve urban party interests." Indeed as Buenker suggests, "Whatever position the urban political machine may have taken on many popular reform matters, it gradually came to realize the advantages inherent in any political adjustment that augmented the influence of the city . . . in practice this meant vigorously championing an expansion of urban leverage through such devices as . . . the direct primary?" (p. 135). In short, electoral reforms may have been manipulated to benefit strongly organized parties, which explains why some strong parties enthusiastically adopted reforms such as primaries.
It is more important to note, we derived the predicted values of party registration, primaries, and secret ballots from the respective first-stage probit models in Table 5 . These predicted values serve as instruments for the endogenous electoral law variables in the second-stage instrumental variable (IV) regression of the 2SPLS model, where the dependent variable is split-ticket voting. 16 The results from the second-stage IV regression of the 2SPLS model are reported in Model 13, Table 6 , for the full sample with state fixed effects.
17
The coefficient of the instrumented party registration variable is negative and highly significant in Model 13. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient of the instrumented party registration variable is substantially larger than the estimated coefficient for this variable in the TSCS models. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase of the instrumented party registration variable decreases split-ticket voting by a remarkable 34% when other variables are held at their mean in the sample. This shows that after correcting for endogeneity, party registration has a stronger effect on the level of split-ticket voting. The negative and significant impact of the instrumented party regisHarvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 389 A second methodological problem that could have produced inconsistent parameter estimates in the TSCS models is selection bias. In particular, it is possible that unobservable factors that affect the likelihood that we observe each of our electoral institutions are also correlated with levels of split-ticket voting. For example, it is possible that politicians in different states could have had strategic incentives-which is an unobservable factor-to introduce electoral reform. Because we cannot explicitly control for such strategic incentives, or any other unobservable factor that could be correlated with the institutional variables and split-ticket voting in our regression models, it is possible that our estimates from especially the TSCS models reported earlier are biased. We estimate Heckman selection models for each electoral institution to correct the potential selection bias problem mentioned above. The estimates from the first-stage probit models in Table 5 serve as the selection equation for each electoral institutional variable in the Heckman model.
The coefficients from the selection equation for each electoral institution can then be used to derive the variables Lambda 1 for party registration, Lambda 2 for primaries, and Lambda 3 for secret ballots-which separately provide an estimate of the bias introduced into the sample by the process that determines the probability of observing party registration, primaries, or secret ballots. We then introduce the selection-corrected estimate Lambda 1 as a substitute for party registration in the second stage of the Heckman model that is estimated via OLS. We repeat this exercise in separate secondstage Heckman models wherein we use Lambda 2 as a substitute for primaries and Lambda 3 as a substitute for secret ballots. The estimates from the selection-corrected Heckman models for each electoral institutions with PCSEs, the lag of the dependent variable, state fixed effects, and other controls are reported in Table 7 .
The selection-corrected estimate of party registration (Lambda 1 ) with state fixed effects in Model 17, Table 7 , is negative and highly significant. The coefficient of the selection-corrected estimate for primaries, Lambda 2 , and secret ballots, Lambda 3 , has the predicted positive sign and is significant in Models 18 and 19.
18 Hence, after correcting for sample selection, the predictions in Hypotheses 1 and 2 find considerable support.
Conclusion
To sum up, we suggested in this article that the introduction of electoral institutions such as party registration in some states, which increased the observability of partisan actions, helped to increase the level and/or strength of partisanship (or, in other words, had a negative impact on split-ticket votHarvey, Mukherjee / Partisanship Levels 393 Note: Dependent variable in all models is split. Entries are selection-corrected (second-stage) OLS estimates from Heckman models. Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in the parentheses. A time trend variable is included in each model but not reported to conserve space. The selection-corrected coefficient for (a) Party Registration is in column 1, (b) Primaries is in column 2 and (c) Secret Ballots is in column 3. The specifications in columns 1, 2, and 3 are each estimated with state fixed effects. The first lag of the dependent variable is included in each specification to correct for serial correlation. a. a = .01.
ing). Conversely, electoral institutions such as primaries and secret ballots decreased the probability of observing partisan actions and, hence, reduced the level of partisanship (i.e., increased the degree of split-ticket voting). Using TSCS data on statewide levels of split-ticket voting between 1880 and 1940, we demonstrated that each of our two hypotheses finds statistical support in the data. These estimates remain robust after corrections for endogeneity and selection bias. These results make two main contributions to the literature on partisanship. First, as pointed out earlier, the existing literature does not adequately explain why levels of partisanship vary across states. By demonstrating how variation in electoral institutions can engender variability in levels of partisanship across states, our model and statistical tests help to address this important empirical puzzle. Second, existing studies that address variation in partisanship across the United States do so primarily from a cross-sectional perspective (see, e.g., Finkel & Scarrow, 1985; Norrander, 1989) . This is methodologically problematic because cross-sectional analysis ignores the possible temporal effects of the introduction of electoral laws on split-ticket voting. Our utilization of TSCS data directly addresses the aforementioned methodological problem. Moreover, unlike Burden and Greene's (2000) study that only focuses on the impact of party registration on turnout in the 1988, 1990, and 1992 U.S. Senate elections, our pooled analysis analyzes not only the impact of party registration but also primaries and secret ballots on split-ticket voting from 1880 to 1940.
The analyses presented here can be extended in two directions. First, although the EC models provide information on the immediate impact of electoral laws on split-ticket voting, we need to study the instantaneous effects of electoral laws on split-ticket voting in much more detail. Second, given severe data constraints and especially the absence of data on individual split-ticket voting in the 1880-1940 period, it may be worthwhile to do a more in-depth historical analysis to test the theoretical claims proposed in this article. -, where g it is the Democratic vote share for governor in state i in year t, and c is the statewide average Democratic vote share for Congress in state i in year t it . c it , in turn, is defined as 14. The mean and largest VIF values in each of the TSCS regression models is substantially lesser than 1 and 10, respectively, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem.
15. The joint Davidson-MacKinnon tests reject the null of exogeneity between all the electoral law variables of interest and the dependent variable (19.4631, p < .0001).
16. We checked for the validity of these instruments by conducting the test of overidentification. This test accepts the null that the instruments used for the endogenous electoral institutions are uncorrelated with the error term. The result from this test is .41443, c 2 (q) with p > .714. This fails to reject the null that the instruments we use are uncorrelated with the error term. 17. We multiplied the estimated standard errors from the second-stage IV regression by an appropriate weighting factor (Achen, 1986 ) to obtain accurate standard errors.
18. We estimated the Heckman selection model separately for only nonsouthern states and only southern states. There was no qualitative difference between the results reported in Table 7 and those obtained for nonsouthern and southern states.
